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MEMORY AS MENTAL TIME 
TRAVEL
Denis Perrin and Kourken Michaelian
1. Introduction: continuism and discontinuism  
about mental time travel
When Tulving (1972) first introduced the term, he defined episodic memory essentially as a 
specialized store devoted to information about the ‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘where’ of experienced 
past events. Episodic memory thus contrasted both with nondeclarative memory, devoted in 
part to skills and habits, and, within the category of declarative memory, with semantic memory, 
devoted to general facts. This definition was broadly compatible with traditional analyses of what 
philosophers had referred to as recollective, experiential, or personal memory (Brewer 1996), 
including the popular causal theory (Martin and Deutscher 1966; Bernecker 2010). But semantic 
memory, too, is capable of storing information about the what, when, and where of events, and 
accumulating evidence of a tight relationship between the ability to remember the past and the 
ability to imagine the future subsequently led most psychologists (including Tulving 2002) to 
redefine episodic memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) in which the subject imaginatively 
re-experiences past events, just as, in future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) he imagina-
tively ‘pre-experiences’ future events (Michaelian et  al. 2016; De Brigard, Chapter 10, this 
volume). It is unclear whether this new definition of episodic memory as mental time travel is 
compatible with traditional philosophical analyses, which assume that there is a deep difference 
between remembering the past and imagining the future. Empirical research within the MTT 
framework has revealed a wealth of commonalities between episodic memory and FMTT, 
leaving no doubt that there is some sort of tight relationship between them. But is it really the 
case, as the framework suggests, that the only important difference between episodic memory 
and FMTT is constituted by their distinct temporal orientations?
Those to whom we will refer as continuists answer this question in the affirmative, main-
taining that, aside from their distinct temporal orientations, there is no fundamental difference 
between episodic memory and FMTT – that there is a single general faculty of mental time 
travel (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007). Those to whom we will refer as discontinuists answer 
in the negative, arguing that ‘[episodic memories] of past events and [episodic imaginations] 
of future events are ultimately mental occurrences of two different kinds’ (Debus 2014).1 The 
debate between continuists and discontinuists is ongoing, and this chapter will not attempt to 
settle it. The aim of the chapter is, more modestly, to survey the evidence and arguments to 
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which continuists and discontinuists have appealed. Section 2 describes plausible versions of 
continuism and discontinuism. Sections 3 and 4 provide a brief overview of the psychological 
evidence for each view. Section 5 provides a more detailed review of philosophical arguments 
for discontinuism, and Section 6 sets out continuist critiques of those arguments. Finally, 
Section 7 discusses one promising discontinuist response to continuist critiques.
2. Varieties of continuism and discontinuism
A degree of conceptual ambiguity is an inevitable feature of any new theoretical framework, 
and it has not always been clear exactly what is at stake in debates over the continuity or 
discontinuity of episodic memory and FMTT (Klein 2016). It is crucial, in particular, for 
parties to the debate to be explicit about whether they hold episodic memory and FMTT 
to be different/the same in kind or merely in degree. An extreme continuist, for example, 
might maintain that their distinct temporal orientations constitute literally the only difference 
between episodic memory and FMTT, but there is also room for a view which acknowledges 
the existence of differences of degree while insisting that episodic memory and FMTT are 
the same in kind. Thus (anticipating some of the evidence reviewed in Section 4 below) a 
moderate continuist might grant, for example, that imagining future events is somewhat more 
cognitively effortful than remembering past events and that it involves a correspondingly 
stronger activation of certain brain regions, but argue that what is at issue in both remembering 
the past and imagining the future is nevertheless a single process, carried out by a single system. 
In light of the evidence for differences of degree between episodic memory and FMTT, most 
continuists endorse something like this moderate view.
Extreme and moderate forms of discontinuism are likewise available. An extreme discon-
tinuist would maintain that episodic memory and FMTT have nothing at all in common with 
each other, but there is also room for a view which acknowledges the existence of similarities of 
degree while insisting that episodic memory and FMTT are different in kind. Thus (anticipating 
the evidence reviewed in Section 3), a moderate discontinuist might grant that episodic memory 
and FMTT involve constructive episodic simulation of events and that constructive episodic 
simulation, in turn, depends on the brain’s core network but argue that the necessity of a causal 
link with past experience underwrites a difference in kind between the process of remembering 
the past and that of imagining the future.
In light of the evidence for quantitative similarities between episodic memory and FMTT, 
most discontinuists endorse something like this moderate view. But the fact that both con-
tinuists and discontinuists agree that there are some similarities and some differences between 
episodic memory and FMTT should not lead us to underestimate the extent of the disagree-
ment between them: for the latter, there is a difference in kind between what we do when we 
remember the past and what we do when we imagine the future; for the former, there is only 
a difference of degree.
3. Empirical evidence for continuism
A detailed review of the empirical evidence for each of these views would be out of place 
here, but this section will review some of the highlights of the evidence for continuism, and 
the following section will do the same thing for discontinuism.2
Perhaps the most impressive evidence for continuism comes from imaging studies, which 
have demonstrated that strongly overlapping regions of the brain are involved in both 
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episodic memory and FMTT, supporting the claim that a core (or default) network, whose 
major components include medial prefrontal regions, posterior regions in the medial and lat-
eral parietal cortex, the lateral temporal cortex and the medial temporal lobe, constitutes the 
neural basis for both forms of MTT (Addis et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2007). This claim, in 
turn, aligns with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter and Addis 2007a, 
b), which, in a refinement of Bartlett’s insights on the constructive character of remembering 
(Bartlett 1932; Wagoner 2016), sees both remembering the past and imagining the future as 
products of a constructive, simulational process in which traces of disparate past experiences 
are linked together into coherent representations of particular events, the difference between 
them being simply that, in FMTT, the process simulates possible future events, whereas, in 
episodic memory, it simulates past events. While there is debate about how, exactly, to char-
acterize the process in question,3 the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis comes close 
to capturing the dominant view among psychologists and neuroscientists on the relationship 
between episodic memory and FMTT.
Imaging evidence is reinforced by evidence from a variety of other sources. Studies of MTT 
in memory-impaired patients have found that deficits in the ability to remember one’s past are 
strongly correlated with deficits in the ability to imagine one’s future (e.g. Klein et al. 2002; 
Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Hassabis et al. 2007). Similarly, patients suffering from depression dis-
play parallel tendencies to remember the past and to imagine the future in overly general ways 
(Williams et  al. 1996), and the capacities to remember past episodes and to imagine future 
episodes emerge in development at roughly the same age (Suddendorf and Busby 2005; Atance 
2008; Perner et al. 2010; Suddendorf 2010; Viard et al. 2012). Further support for continuism 
comes from studies of phenomenological similarities between episodic memory and FMTT. 
Level of detail and intensity of experience vary with temporal distance in a similar manner in 
both forms of MTT (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004, 2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2011; 
Addis et al. 2011; Schacter et al. 2012), in line with Tulving’s (1985) claim that the same phe-
nomenology continuism comes from studies of phenomenological similarities between episodic 
memory and FMTT. Level of detail and intensity of experience vary with temporal distance. 
And studies of autobiographical memory have found that episodic memory and FMTT are 
organized in a similar fashion, in the sense that autobiographical memories and autobiographical 
future events are embedded in the same narrative structures (Rathbone et al. 2011).
4. Empirical evidence for discontinuism
Psychology and neuroscience have thus provided persuasive evidence for continuism. But they 
have also provided evidence for discontinuism, and, after an initial wave of enthusiasm for 
extreme forms of continuism, there has been a tendency to adopt more qualified views (Schacter 
et al. 2012). Remembered past events, for example, are associated with richer and more vivid 
sensory and contextual detail than imagined future events (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 
2004, 2006; Addis et  al. 2010) or imagined past events (Addis et  al. 2010; De Brigard and 
Giovanello 2012), and the emotional valence of remembered and imagined episodes displays a 
similar discrepancy, with imagined future events being characterized by a greater positivity bias 
than remembered past events (Berntsen and Bohn 2010; Rasmussen and Bertsen 2013). Perhaps 
this evidence of phenomenological discrepancies only suggests a difference of degree between 
episodic memory and FMTT, but other evidence seems to suggest a difference in kind. Imaging 
studies have revealed that imagining is more cognitively demanding than remembering and in 
fact draws on brain regions that are not solicited by remembering (D’Argembeau and Van der 
Linden 2004; Schacter and Addis 2007a; Addis et al. 2007; Szpunar et al. 2007; McDonough 
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and Gallo 2010; Martin et al. 2011), and there is evidence that impairments of certain brain 
regions affect FMTT but not episodic memory (Berryhill et al. 2010). Indeed, some research-
ers have even argued that two subsystems can be distinguished within the core network, with 
only episodic memory requiring reactivation of regions involved in the original processing of 
remembered information (Addis et  al. 2009), and others have argued that imagining future 
events, in contrast to remembering past events, relies on conceptual knowledge to provide a 
scaffolding for the integration of episodic details (Irish et al. 2012; Duval et al. 2012); conse-
quently, FMTT may be more schema-driven than episodic memory (Szpunar 2010; Irish et al. 
2012; Duval et al. 2012; Rasmussen and Berntsen 2013; Klein and Steindam 2016).
Further support for discontinuism is provided by functional considerations. Remembering 
and imagining may have different functions with respect to the self, emotion, and behav-
iour regulation (Shao et al. 2010; Rasmussen and Berntsen 2013). For instance, an increased 
positivity bias for imagined future relative to remembered past events has been documented 
and it has been proposed this would show that episodic memory is more devoted to prob-
lem solving and behaviour regulation, while FMTT is more dedicated to securing positive 
self-image, regulating emotions and prompting us to approach novelty. And the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis itself suggests that episodic memory has the function of storing 
information which is then recombined in FMTT, thus assigning a distinctive functional role 
to memory. Against this view, continuists have argued that, while episodic memory indeed has 
this function, it performs the function with respect to the process of FMTT and the process 
of episodic remembering alike, both of which involve the recombination of stored information 
(Michaelian 2016a). But it may be possible to distinguish between a process of recombination, 
at work in imagining the future, and a process of recapitulation, at work in remembering the 
past (Addis et al. 2009; Storm and Jobe 2012), in which case there might still turn out to be a 
functional difference between FMTT and episodic memory.
5. Philosophical arguments for discontinuism
Given that there is empirical evidence for both continuities and discontinuities between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT, such evidence is unlikely to settle the debate between continuists 
and discontinuists. It is not immediately clear, for example, whether continuism is incompatible 
with the existence of distinct subsystems for episodic memory and FMTT within the core net-
work, nor is it clear whether recombination and recapitulation amount to qualitatively different 
functions. Conceptual considerations thus take centre stage, allowing philosophical arguments 
to play a potentially decisive role in the debate. This section and the next review the main argu-
ments that have been advanced so far, focusing in turn on epistemological, metaphysical, and 
phenomenological considerations.
Beginning with epistemology, one argument for discontinuism turns on the possibility or 
impossibility of error through misidentification in episodic memory and FMTT (Perrin 2016). 
On the one hand, when one episodically remembers, it is arguably possible for one to mistake 
an individual (object or person) figuring in the remembered episode for a similar but distinct 
individual, since the identity of the remembered individual is determined by one’s past causal 
interactions with it. In other words, one can misidentify a remembered individual – episodic 
memory is not immune to error through misidentification.4 On the other hand, when one 
engages in FMTT, it is arguably impossible for one to mistake an individual figuring in the 
imagined episode for another individual, since the identity of the imagined individual is in 
effect stipulated by the imagining subject. In other words, one cannot misidentify an imagined 
individual – FMTT is immune to error through misidentification.
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Turning to metaphysics, another argument for discontinuism concerns the nature of the 
mental contents involved in remembering the past and imagining the future. Intuitively, epi-
sodic memory provides the subject with a form of direct contact with past events. According 
to relationalists about the objects of memory (e.g. Campbell 2002; Debus 2008, 2013, 2014; 
cf. Recanati 1993, 2007; Perrin 2016), when a subject episodically remembers an event, the 
remembered event literally constitutes part of the content of his memory. Consequently, the 
event must play a role in the individuation of the memory content. In this sense, episodic 
memory is ‘world-involving’. When a subject imagines the future, however, the imagined 
event cannot play a role in the individuation of content, since, in order for an event to consti-
tute part of the content of a mental state, it must be actual, not merely possible. Thus FMTT is 
not world-involving.
A related but distinct metaphysical argument concerns the particularity of the objects of 
MTT. Episodic memory seems to involve thinking about particular events with which one is 
acquainted through experience. FMTT, in contrast, seems to involve thinking about general 
types of events. For example, some have suggested that we imagine future events by thinking of 
general types of events and mentally projecting them forwards in time (Martin 2001; Campbell 
2002; Debus 2008, 2014). While this argument is distinct from the previous argument, the 
generality-particularity discrepancy may stem from the possibility-actuality discrepancy, assum-
ing that only actual events can be particular (Debus 2014).
A final metaphysical argument, or rather a pair of arguments, concerns the role of causation 
in episodic memory and FMTT. One argument maintains that episodic memory requires an 
appropriate causal link with the remembered experience, in contrast to FMTT, which obvi-
ously cannot require an analogous link (Perrin 2016). Consider a case of ‘quasi-memory’ in 
which the identity of the subject whose experiences are ‘remembered’ does not coincide with 
the identity of the subject who ‘remembers’ the experiences. In such a case, the ‘remem-
bering’ subject is arguably not remembering at all, but merely imagining. When a subject 
imagines the future, in contrast, he would seem to be engaged in the same process regardless 
of whether he imagines his own experience or that of another subject. Another argument 
maintains that episodic memory and FMTT involve different kinds of awareness of potential 
causal links (Debus 2016). When one imagines a future event, one is arguably aware of the fact 
that it is causally open, in the sense that someone—perhaps oneself—might intervene to bring 
about or prevent the occurrence of the event. When one imagines a past event, however, one 
has no such awareness.
Further arguments for discontinuism point to apparent qualitative phenomenological differ-
ences between episodic memory and FMTT. One such argument claims that episodic memory 
alone involves experiential awareness (Debus 2014; cf. Martin 2001; Campbell 2002). This 
claim is related to the point concerning the actuality of the objects of episodic memory noted 
above. In order for someone to be experientially aware of an event, the event must presum-
ably be actual; in other words, one cannot be experientially aware of merely possible events. 
Thus episodic memory, which concerns actual events, may involve experiential awareness, but 
FMTT, which concerns possible events, cannot.
A distinct phenomenological argument claims that autonoetic consciousness arises in a dif-
ferent manner in episodic memory and FMTT (Klein 2016; Perrin 2016). In episodic memory, 
awareness that the remembered event ‘belongs’ to oneself seems to arise in a prereflective man-
ner. In FMTT, in contrast, it seems to be the result of a deliberate, inferential process. Indeed, 
while some have taken autonoesis to be a necessary feature of FMTT, others have argued that 
a simulated future experience remains essentially unaltered when the identity of the imagined 
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subject shifts from the identity of the imagining subject to that of another subject. If this is right, 
autonoetic consciousness, which concerns the self, turns out not to be a necessary feature of 
FMTT, strengthening the contrast between FMTT and episodic memory (Perrin 2016).
6. Philosophical arguments for continuism
These arguments for discontinuism fit well with traditional philosophical analyses of remember-
ing, one of the main goals of which has been to provide criteria for demarcating remembering 
from imagining. The causal theory, in particular, presupposes that there is a difference in kind 
between remembering the past and imagining it and maintains that this difference is to be 
understood in terms of the presence or absence of an appropriate causal link with the repre-
sented event. What makes the difference between remembering a past event and imagining it, 
according to the theory, is that the former involves an appropriate causal link with the repre-
sented event, while the latter does not. According to standard versions of the causal theory, what 
makes a causal link appropriate, in the relevant sense, is that it is sustained by the preservation of 
traces of the subject’s original experience of the event.
The presupposition that there is a difference in kind between remembering the past and 
imagining it is threatened by the MTT framework, and some philosophers have argued that it 
should be abandoned entirely. MTT research suggests that the boundary between remembering 
the past and imagining it may be blurry (Shanton and Goldman 2010) and perhaps even that 
there is no boundary at all (Michaelian 2016b). In line with the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis, simulationist accounts of episodic memory thus reject the goal of providing criteria 
for demarcating remembering from imagining, instead classifying remembering as a kind of 
imagining. According to these accounts, there is no difference in kind between remembering 
the past and imagining it – to remember simply is to imagine the past.
Assuming that there is no difference in kind between imagining the past and imagining the 
future, simulationism entails continuism. It would be question-begging to appeal directly to 
simulationism in an attempt to defeat discontinuist arguments, and such an appeal would over-
look the fact that MTT research has also provided evidence for discontinuism. Nevertheless, 
simulationism has a role to play in the debate. The empirical evidence for discontinuism is 
compatible with a broadly simulationist approach. The claim that distinct subsystems of the 
core network are involved in episodic memory and FMTT, for example, is compatible with the 
claim that episodic memory and FMTT are both simulational in character. And if remember-
ing is simulational in character, it need not involve a causal link – simulation inevitably draws 
on traces originating in past experience, but simulation of a given past event need not draw on 
traces originating in experience of that particular event. Arguments for discontinuism assume 
that such a causal link is necessary, and the simulationist approach, by reminding us that that 
assumption is problematic, points to potential responses to those arguments.
As we saw above, for example, discontinuists might claim that there is an epistemological 
difference between episodic memory and FMTT, arguing that the latter is immune to error 
through misidentification, whereas the former is not. The idea is that, since FMTT is a form 
of imagination, the identities of the individuals figuring in the representations produced by it 
are simply stipulated by the subject, whereas, since episodic memory requires a causal link with 
past experience, the identities of the individuals figuring in the representations produced by it 
may be inherited from the subject’s past causal interactions with them, opening up the possibil-
ity of error in the latter case but not the former. If we accept that both episodic memory and 
FMTT are simulational in character, however, this apparent discontinuity may be undermined 
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(Michaelian 2016a). On the one hand, since both episodic memory representations and FMTT 
representations are generated by simulations based on past experience, identities may be inher-
ited from causal interactions in both cases. On the other hand, since both episodic memory 
representations and FMTT representations are produced by simulations, identities may not be 
inherited in a straightforward manner, and stipulation by the subject may play a role in both cases. 
In short, both forms of MTT may sometimes be immune to error through misidentification and 
sometimes fail to be immune to error through misidentification.
Turning to metaphysical arguments, we saw that discontinuists might argue that past events 
are constituents of episodic memories, whereas future events are not constituents of episodic 
future thoughts. There are real worries about how a past event might come to serve as part of 
a current mental state, but even if we set these aside, the argument encounters a difficulty analo-
gous to one known to afflict direct realism in the philosophy of perception. Direct realists argue 
that perceived objects are constituents of perceptual states. This forces them to posit a difference 
in kind between genuine perceptual states and hallucinations, a position known as disjunctiv-
ism. Similarly, discontinuists are forced to posit a difference in kind between genuine memories 
and ‘memory hallucinations’ – i.e. false memories – and thus to adopt a form of disjunctivism 
about memory. Disjunctivism is implausible in both instances, because it posits metaphysical 
differences where there are no corresponding empirical differences: in cases of genuine per-
ception and perceptual hallucination, everything might be the same in neural, cognitive, and 
phenomenological terms, and the same thing goes for cases of genuine memory and memory 
hallucination. Discontinuists might insist that the presence of a causal link with a past event, in 
the case of genuine memory, grounds a metaphysical difference between genuine memory and 
memory hallucination, but, if remembering is a simulational process, there need be no such link. 
Moreover, the initial intuitive appeal of direct realism or relationalism is largely undermined by 
the simulational character of remembering: if there need be no causal link between a memory of 
a past event and the subject’s original experience of it, the claim that the past event is a constituent 
of the subject’s memory of it becomes difficult to motivate.
Discontinuists have also argued that episodic memory involves thinking about particular 
events, whereas FMTT involves thinking about generic events. Bearing in mind the simula-
tional character of both episodic memory and FMTT, continuists might respond by arguing 
that, if episodic memory can involve thinking about past events, then so can FMTT and that, 
if FMTT can involve thinking about generic events, then so can episodic memory (Michaelian 
2016a). On the one hand, we might sometimes imagine future events not by imagining generic 
events and projecting them forwards in time, as discontinuists suggest, but rather by remember-
ing past events and projecting them forwards in time. In such cases, if the memory refers to 
a particular event, then so, presumably, does the imagination. On the other hand, we might 
sometimes remember past events by imagining generic events and projecting them backwards 
in time. In such cases, if the imagination refers to a generic event, then so, presumably, does 
the memory.
The arguments discussed so far depend indirectly on assumptions about causation, but, as 
we saw above, discontinuists have also argued more directly that episodic memory and FMTT 
differ with respect to causation. Focusing on memory, they have argued straightforwardly that 
a causal link to the represented event is necessary in the case of remembering, in contrast to 
FMTT, where it is neither necessary nor possible. Here, continuists can reply that, given what 
we know about the simulational nature of remembering, there can be no guarantee that any 
given case of remembering involves a causal link to the represented event. Discontinuists are 
free to insist that only where there is a causal link does genuine remembering occur, but, again, 
this is to posit a metaphysical difference without a corresponding empirical difference – MTT 
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research suggests that remembering involves the same process, regardless of whether a causal 
link is preserved. The continuist alternative is to treat cases of quasi-memory, for example, not 
as cases in which the subject merely seems to remember but rather as cases in which the subject 
genuinely remembers but does so inaccurately. Focusing on FMTT, discontinuists have argued 
that FMTT involves awareness of the causal openness of the future; episodic memory does 
not involve a parallel form of awareness, since the past is causally closed. Given the similarity 
between the simulational processes involved in episodic memory and FMTT, however, con-
tinuists can argue that we should expect to find that subjects’ judgements about whether they 
are remembering the past or imagining the future are sometimes mistaken (Michaelian 2016b). 
Whether subjects do indeed make such mistakes is an empirical question, but, assuming that 
they do, there will be cases of FMTT which fail to involve awareness of causal openness, as well 
as cases of episodic memory which involve (mistaken) awareness of causal openness.
An appreciation of the simulational character of remembering likewise grounds continuist 
responses to arguments for phenomenological discontinuities. Discontinuists have argued 
that episodic memory, because it refers to actual events, can involve experiential awareness, 
whereas FMTT, because it does not refer to actual events, cannot. Absent a causal link to 
the event in question, sustained by the preservation of traces of the subject’s experience of 
the event, the actuality of the event cannot underwrite experiential awareness. Research on 
constructive memory and MTT demonstrates that, in routine cases, many components of the 
memory representation are imported from sources other than experience of the remembered 
event. In such cases, the subject is presumably not experientially aware of all aspects of the 
event. And the same research suggests that there are cases in which all components of the 
memory representation are imported from sources other than experience of the remembered 
event. In such cases, the subject is presumably not experientially aware of any aspect of the 
event. Discontinuists might argue that genuine remembering occurs only where at least some 
trace of the original experience is preserved, but, given that similar simulational processes are 
at work in the full range of cases, it would seem to be preferable to abandon talk of experien-
tial awareness altogether.
In an argument for another sort of phenomenological asymmetry, discontinuists have argued 
that episodic memory and FMTT are unalike in that only the former necessarily involves auto-
noetic consciousness. The thought here is that, since episodic memory necessarily concerns 
experienced events, it may involve autonoetic consciousness as an essential feature; since FMTT 
might concern either oneself or another, autonoetic consciousness in FMTT must be the out-
come of an inferential process. The simulational character of remembering may undermine 
this alleged disanalogy. If both past-oriented MTT and future-oriented MTT are simulational 
processes, both might concern either oneself or another. There may be a difference between 
simulating one’s own past experience (i.e. remembering) and simulating the past experience 
of another, but, if so, there is presumably likewise a difference between simulating one’s own 
future experience and simulating the future experience of another. Autonoetic consciousness 
might thus be absent in both MTT into the past of another and MTT into the future of another 
and present in both MTT into one’s own past and MTT into one’s own future. If it is the out-
come of an inferential process in the case of future-oriented MTT, it is presumably the outcome 
of an inferential process in the case of past-oriented MTT as well.
7. Conclusion: continuism, discontinuism, and causation
Ultimately, the debate between continuists and discontinuists seems to boil down to a disa-
greement over the necessity of causation for episodic memory. If episodic memory, despite 
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its simulational character, necessarily involves a causal link to the subject’s experience of the 
remembered event, discontinuism would appear to be the more plausible of the two views. If 
episodic memory does not necessarily involve a causal link to the subject’s experience of the 
remembered event, continuism may carry the day.
MTT research, we have seen, does suggest that remembering need not involve the pres-
ervation of traces of the subject’s experience of the remembered event. But this might not 
be enough to undermine the claim that remembering necessarily involves a causal link to the 
subject’s experience of the remembered event. Standard versions of the causal theory assume 
that appropriate causal links are sustained by the preservation of traces of experience, but there 
are alternatives to this version of the theory. Attributionalist accounts of memory, in particular, 
favour a procedural characterization of the causal links involved in remembering (Jacoby et al. 
1989; Mitchell and Johnson 2000; Addis et al. 2009), claiming that the detection of procedural 
properties (such as fluency) of subpersonal processes triggers attribution to past experience. 
Such properties, in turn, reflect past experience, so, if attributionalism is right, episodic memory 
would result from the monitoring of a procedural effect of past experience. Attributionalism 
has considerable advantages. It allows us to preserve the distinction between remembering and 
merely imagining the past which is abandoned by simulationist approaches, since fluency can 
trigger attribution to past experience even when it is due to other causes. And it can explain the 
observation that greater neural activity is observed in FMTT than in episodic memory, since the 
simulation involved in episodic memory will in general be more fluent, due to the effect of past 
experience, than that involved in FMTT. But its main import, in the present context, is that it 
promises to identify a causal difference between episodic memory and FMTT, which may in 
turn sustain the various epistemological, metaphysical, and phenomenological differences for 
which discontinuists argue.
Whether attributionalism can ultimately fulfil this promise remains to be seen. Attributionalism 
may secure a causal difference between episodic memory and FMTT without securing a differ-
ence sufficient to sustain the qualitative differences that discontinuists posit. And it may yet turn 
out that attributionalism does not in fact secure a causal difference between episodic memory 
and FMTT. In essence, attributionalism says that representations resulting from more fluent 
simulations tend to be attributed to past experience. Fluency, in turn, is typically an effect of past 
experience. Thus, in cases where the subject takes himself to be remembering, there will usu-
ally be a causal link with past experience. There is, however, no guarantee of such a link, since 
fluency may result from other causes. When it does, discontinuists must claim that the subject 
merely seems to remember, on penalty of admitting that a causal link is not in fact necessary for 
remembering. Continuists, however, will respond that this claim is unmotivated: if the same 
simulational process unfolds in two cases, and if both cases are characterized by the same level 
of fluency, both should be categorized as cases of remembering. In the final analysis, then, the 
continuist–discontinuist debate may bottom out in a clash of intuitions over the necessity of 
causation for remembering.
Notes
1 Psychologists have tended to favour continuism, whereas philosophers have tended to favour discon-
tinuism. But the theoretical divide need not align with the disciplinary border, and some psychologists 
remain sceptical of the evidence for continuism (e.g. Friedman 2007; Klein and Steindam 2016), while 
some philosophers have developed continuist analyses that classify episodic memory and FMTT alike as 
forms of imagination (Hopkins 2014; Michaelian 2016b).
2 See Suddendorf and Corballis (2007), and Szpunar (2010) for further detail.
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3 Compare, e.g. the self-projection approach (Buckner and Carroll 2007) and the scene construction 
approach (Hassabis and Maguire 2009).
4 There is a debate among philosophers as to whether episodic memories are immune to error through 
misidentification or not. Evans (1982) and Hamilton (2007) answer in the affirmative, while Shoemaker 
(1970) and Coliva (2006) maintain this is only a contingent feature of remembering. Our take here is 
closer to the latter, which we cannot argue for here for reason of space.
Related topics
 • Taxonomy and unity of memory
 • Phenomenology of remembering
 • Memory causation
 • Intentional objects of memory
 • Memory and consciousness
 • Memory and imagination
 • Frederic Bartlett
Further reading
For an introduction to mental time travel, see Chapter 6 of Michaelian, K. 2016b. Mental Time Travel: 
Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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